“Judge: Take infant off life support”
So reads the headline in this article in the Indianapolis Star.
A judge ordered life support removed Friday from a 5-month-old Indianapolis boy with a severe head injury that investigators say was caused by abuse.
The Marion County Department of Child Services requested the removal of the ventilator that is keeping Hamad Elijah Sanda alive. The agency took custody of the baby Sept. 26, four days after he was brought to the Methodist Hospital emergency room with a skull fracture and brain injury.
Citing the boy’s grave condition and testimony from medical experts who said there was nothing more they could do, Superior Court Judge Marilyn Moores issued the order over the objections of Hamad’s mother, Tiwanna Sanda. The judge also issued a “do not resuscitate” order.
Although whether a court has the authority to order the discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment under the proper circumstances has almost always been answered in the affirmative, the courts which have expressly discussed this issue have put forth a number of theories as to the basis of the authority. The state’s parens patriae power has been identified as one foundation for such power. Another has been predicated upon the proposition that the patient himself or herself has a right to such discontinuance and that the action of the court serves to exercise or protect that right. Courts have also considered the effect of a patient’s incompetency on his or her right to discontinue treatment, and something similar to this appears to have entered the equation in this case in that the “true” parent lacked credibility. In evaluating particular situations, a number of courts have been influenced by a distinction between treatment considered to be “ordinary” and treatment considered to be “extraordinary.” Based solely upon the article, the necessary treatment in this case also appears to be “extraordinary.”
